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Abstract
The paper analyzes conditions for implementing incentive schemes
based on, respectively joint, relative and indendent performance, in a
relational contract between a principal and a team of two agents. A
main result is that the optimal incentive regime depends on the produc-
tivity of the agents, or more preciseley on the returns from high eﬀort.
This occurs because agents’ productivites aﬀect the principal’s tempta-
tion to renege on the relational contract. The analysis suggests that we
will see a higher frequency of relative performance evaluation (RPE)
- and schemes that lie close to independent performance evaluation -
as we move from low-productive to high-productive environments. In
particular, it is shown that if eﬀort-productivity is suﬃcently high, the
optimal scheme for the principal is (for a range of discount factors) a
collusion-proof RPE scheme, even if there is no common shock that
aﬀects the agents’ output.
1 Introduction
High-productive workers are more often than low-productive workers gov-
erned by high-powered incentive regimes (see e.g. Lazear, 1998). And while
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group incentives typically are enjoyed by low-wage ‘blue-collar’ workers, in-
centives based on individual or relative performance (including promotion-
tournaments) are more common among ‘white collar’ workers at higher or-
ganizational levels (see Prendergast, 1999; and Appelbaum and Berg, 1999).
These observations can be explained by endogenous matching,1 but in
this paper we explore the relationship between productivity and incentive
regime by taking a diﬀerent approach: We show that when workers’ pro-
ductivity aﬀects the employer’s temptation to renege on contracts, then the
optimal incentive regime (based on joint, relative or independent perfor-
mance) will depend on the productivity of the workers.
We build our analysis on a model that capture quite common features of
employment contracts: 1. They are long-term (or dynamic). The employer
(principal) and her workers (agents) interact repeatedly, and the princi-
pal must deal with problems of dynamic moral hazard. 2. Employment
contracts are (to some extent ) relational. A relational contract contains
elements that cannot be verified by third parties. A worker’s performance,
for instance, may be observable, but still diﬃcult to verify by a court, since
the assessment of performance may be complicated. In repeated interaction
the parties are able to self-enforce contracts that are not court-enforceable,
since contract deviation can ruin the ongoing relationship. 3. Employment
contracts are multilateral. In organizations with more than one worker, the
employer must not only control the decisions of a single agent; she must also
take into account that her treatment of one worker may aﬀect the behavior
of other workers. In addition she must consider the strategic behavior of
workers interacting with each other.
In the literature on employment contracts, each of these features have
attained much attention, but usually they are not analyzed within the same
model. We incorporate the above features in one model, and compare the
eﬃciency of diﬀerent incentive regimes. While this may seem ambitious, we
stick to a quite simple model: We assume risk neutrality, and as shown by
Levin (2003), optimal relational contracts between risk neutral parties have
the nice feature of being stationary.2 Hence, the potentially complex con-
1Observed correlation between contracts and other variables, such as riskiness and
productivity, can be understood as heterogenous agents choosing diﬀerent environments,
see e.g. Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) and Chiappori and Salanie (2002).
2 In a stationary contract, the principal promises the same contingent compensation in
each period.
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tracting problems that arise in dynamic relationships can be solved by simple
self-enforcing stationary contracts, given some assumptions. So we analyze
a multiagent moral hazard problem within a repeated game framework of
self-enforcing relational contracts, and compare incentive schemes based on
joint performance evaluation (JPE), relative performance evaluation (RPE)
and independent performance evaluation (IPE).
Two papers come closest to ours: First, Levin (2002) who compares
multilateral to bilateral relational employment contracts in a model with n
agents. An important insight is that multilateral contracts need only satisfy
the sum of individual constraints. This favors relative performance evalu-
ation since the principal can credibly commit to a limited total payment.3
Second, Che and Yoo (2001) who analyze a repeated game between one
principal and two agents where the agents engage in implicit contracting4
with each other. This repeated agent-interaction favors joint performance
evaluation since the agents have means for peer sanctions, which lowers
the principal’s costs of providing incentives. While Levin does not consider
repeated agent-agent interaction, Che and Yoo do not consider relational
contracting between principal and agents. We complement Che and Yoo’s
model by assuming that the agents’ output is not verifiable. In such we
model a multilateral relational employment contract that includes repeated
interaction between agents. And we can thus run a ’horse race’ between the
commitment advantage of RPE and the peer-monitoring advantage of JPE.
A main result is that the optimal incentive regime (JPE, RPE or IPE)
depends on the productivity of the agents, or more precisely on the returns
from high eﬀort. This occurs because agents’ productivity aﬀect the prin-
cipal’s temptation to renege on the relational contract: The higher eﬀort-
productivity, the more there is to lose from breaking promises. One inter-
pretation of the model is that we will see a higher frequency of RPE (and
3Malcomson (1984) and Carmichael (1981) make a similar argument.
4Relational’ contracts and ‘implicit’ contracts are used synonymously in the literature.
MacLeod and Malcomson (1989), Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994) and Schmidt and
Schnitzer (1995) used ‘implicit’, while Bull (1987) used both ‘implicit’ and ‘relational’.
Newer papers such as Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002) and Levin (2003) use ‘relational’,
inspired by the legal literature, particularly MacNeil (1978). Since implicit contracts can
be interpreted as vaguer than relational contracts (due to the antonym implicit versus
explicit), we will in this paper use the term ‘implicit’ on the contract between the agents
(like Che and Yoo), since it is most natural to think about this contract as a verbal
informal agreement. But we will use ‘relational’ on the contract between the principal
and his agents, since this most likely is a formally written wage contract.
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schemes that lie close to IPE) as we move from low productive to high-
productive environments. For low eﬀort productivity, the cost of contract
deviation is low, and the principal has therefore larger reneging temptations.
Ceteris paribus, this calls for RPE due its commitment advantage. However,
for low eﬀort productivity, relational contracts can only be implemented for
high discount factors. This favors JPE since implicit contracts between the
agents are then easy to self-enforce. As we move towards high-productive
environments, the cost of contract deviation becomes higher, and relational
contracts can therefore be implemented for lower discount factors. We will
then expect a larger fraction of RPE, since the repeated peer-monitoring de-
vice of JPE is vulnerable to low discount factors. This result is interesting
since RPE seems more common in high-productive environments.
In the last section we open for the possibility of collusion between the
agents. RPE is susceptible to collusion since both agents can jointly be
better oﬀ by exerting low eﬀort. We deduce an RPE scheme that is proof
to collusion strategies, and show that our basic conclusions are not altered.
In fact, in the setting where no common shock aﬀects the agents’ outputs,
we show that if eﬀort-productivity is suﬃciently high, the optimal scheme
for the principal is (for a range of discount factors) a collusion-proof RPE
scheme.5 But since the collusion problem increases the cost of RPE, we
also find that IPE in some cases may come out as the uniquely optimal
contract. Moreover, if collusion is possible, IPE may be uniquely optimal
even if output is verifiable. For this to happen, however, there must be some
common noise. With verifiable output and no common noise JPE dominates
IPE, due to the advantage of peer monitoring. But if we introduce common
noise, JPE does not dominate IPE for all parameter values since the cost of
providing JPE incentives is high if the probability of positive common shock
is high.
An interesting feature of the model is that optimal schemes do not always
take the typical stark forms that are often found in the literature.6 For
instance, we identify schemes that pay the worker both for relative and
individual performance, or both for joint and individual performance. These
less extreme schemes are not eﬃcient when output is verifiable. But the
5As is well known, a main advantage of RPE is that it helps the principal filter out
common noise, see in particular Holmström (1982).
6A notable exception is Carmichael (1983) who identify conditions where it is optimal
to combine RPE with IPE.
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extreme schemes are seldom observed in practice, which indicates that the
relational contract approach is fruitful. Moreover, we find that small changes
in parameter values induce small changes in the form of the optimal contract.
This is in contrast to models where small changes either make no changes
on contract form, or major changes from one extreme to another extreme.
1.1 Related literature
There is a larger literature on multiagent moral hazard in static settings
that compares the costs and benefits of RPE and JPE. As noted, a main
advantage of RPE, stressed in particular by Holmström (1982), is that it
can help the principal filter out common noise so that compensation to the
largest possible extent is based on eﬀort, not random shocks that are out-
side the agent’s control. With RPE’s special form, rank-order tournaments,
the agents are also completely insulated from the risk of common negative
shocks (see Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Stiglitz and Nalebuﬀ, 1983). With
risk averse agents, Green and Stokey (1983) show that piece rate schemes
dominate tournaments when there is no common shocks (since RPE would
only increase risk exposure without improving incentives), but that tourna-
ments may dominate piece rates if there are common shocks. In a model
with two sided moral hazard, (i.e. the principal is involved in production),
Carmichael (1983) finds that RPE may dominate IPE even if there are no
common shocks. Under suﬃcient level of risk aversion, however, IPE domi-
nates RPE.
A problem with RPE, in addition to the collusion problem (analyzed in
particular by Mookherjee; 1984), is that it may induce sabotage and dis-
courage cooperation (see e.g. Lazear, 1989). JPE, on the other hand, can
promote cooperation since an agent is rewarded if his peers perform well
(see e.g. Holmström and Milgrom, 1990; Itoh 1993; and Macho-Stadler and
Perez-Castrillo, 1993). JPE can also provide implicit incentives not to shirk
(or exert low eﬀort), since shirking may have social costs (as in Kandel and
Lazear, 1992). But the classic problem with JPE is of course the free rider
problem, analyzed in particular by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Holm-
ström (1982). However, Che and Yoo (2001) elegantly show how repeated
interaction between the agents can generate incentives and overcome the
free-rider problem.7
7Radner (1986), Weitzman and Kruse, (1990), and FitzRoy and Kraft (1995) have all
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In the literature on relational contracts, the majority of models have
focused on environments where the parties have symmetric information (as
in Klein and Leﬄer, 1981; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Bull 1987; MacLeod
and Malcomson, 1989, Kreps 1990, Levin 2002). But as noted by Levin
(2003), the assumption of symmetric information contrasts with the tra-
ditional incentive theory view that asymmetric information, rather than
enforcement, is the central impediment to eﬀective contracting (e.g. Holm-
ström, 1979). Prior to Levin (2003), who makes a general treatment of the
self-enforcing relational contract model with asymmetric information and
risk neutral agents, only a few, such as Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994,
2002), have analyzed relational contract models with moral hazard in eﬀort.
We complement this literature. To our knowledge, the present paper is the
first to analyze repeated agent-agent interaction within the framework of
relational incentive contracts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the
basic model. A comparative analysis of optimal contracts is presented in
Section 3. Section 4 discusses the implications of collusion, while Section 5
concludes. Unless noted otherwise, all proofs are in the appendix.
2 The Model
Consider an economic environment consisting of one principal and two iden-
tical agents who each period produce either high, QH , or low, QL, values
for the principal. Their eﬀort level can be either high or low, where high
eﬀort has a disutility cost of c and low eﬀort is costless. The principal can
only observe the realization of the agents’ output, not the level of eﬀort
they choose. But the agents can observe each other’s eﬀort decisions. The
agents’ output depend on eﬀort. The probability for agent i of realizing QH
is qH if the agent’s eﬀort is high and qL if the agent’s eﬀort is low, where
1 > qH > qL ≥ 0.
Agent i receives a bonus vector β ≡ (βiHH , βiHL, βiLH , βiLL) where
the subscripts denote respectively agent i and agent j ’s realization of Qi,
(i = H,L). It is assumed that all parties are risk neutral, except that the
pointed out that the folk theorem of repeated games provides a possible answer to the free
rider critique of group incentives. But Che and Yoo is the first to demonstrate this in a
repeated game between the agents.
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agents are subject to limited liability: The principal cannot impose negative
wages.8
Let agent i and j choose eﬀorts k ∈ {H,L} and l ∈ {H,L} respectively.
Agent i ’s expected wage is then
π(k, l,βi) ≡ qkqlβiHH+qk(1−ql)βiHL+(1−qk)qlβiLH+(1−qk)(1−ql)βiLL. (1)
For each agent, a wage scheme exhibits joint performance evaluation if
(βHH , βLH) > (βHL, βLL).9 (For the most part we suppress agent-notation
in superscript since the agents are identical.) In this case π(k,H,β) >
π(k, L,β), so an agent’s work yields positive externalities to his partner.
A wage scheme exhibits relative performance evaluation if (βHH , βLH) <
(βHL, βLL). In this case π(k,H,β) < π(k, L,β), so an agent’s work gen-
erates a negative externality on his partner. A wage scheme exhibits inde-
pendent performance evaluation if (βHH , βLH) = (βHL, βLL), which implies
π(k,H,β) = π(k, L,β), so an agent’s work has no impact on his partner.
2.1 Verifiable output
Assume first that output is verifiable and that high eﬀort is suﬃciently
valuable to the principal so that she always prefers to induce the agents
to exert high eﬀort. The principal’s problem is then to minimize the wage
payments subject to the constraints that the agents must be induced to yield
high eﬀort. In a static setting, a contract β induces high eﬀort from both
agents as a unique equilibrium if
π(H,H,β)− c ≥ π(L,H,β), (2)
π(H,L,β)− c ≥ π(L,L,β). (3)
The left hand sides (LHS) show the expected wage from exerting high eﬀort,
while the right hand sides (RHS) show the expected wage from exerting low
eﬀort. We will solve the principal’s problem regarding (2), and then discuss
8Limited liability may arise from liquidity constraints or from laws that prohibit firms
from extracting payments from workers.
9The inequality means weak inequality of each component and strict inequality for at
least one component.
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optimum against (3). The principal solves
min
β≥0
π(H,H,β), subject to (2). (4)
The incentive constraint (2) can be written
qHβHH + (1− qH)βHL − qHβLH − (1− qH)βLL ≥
c
∆q ,
where ∆q = qH − qL . Since the LHS of the constraint is decreasing in βLH
and βLL, while the objective is increasing in βLH and βLL, it is optimal to
set βLH = βLL = 0. With βLH = βLL = 0 , then any combination of βHH
and βHL that satisfies the IC-constraint with equality is optimal, and yields
expected wage π = qH c∆q . We have the following lemma:
Lemma 1 The optimal static wage scheme when output is verifiable is any
scheme βs = (βHH , βHL, 0, 0) that satisfies (2) with equality. The expected
wage per agent is then π(H,H,βs) = qH c∆q .
The scheme βs in the lemma can be RPE, IPE or JPE. It can be shown
that any RPE scheme and the IPE scheme in βs also satisfy (3) π(H,L,β)−
c ≥ π(L,L,β), while JPE schemes in βs do not (see appendix). Hence, with
incentive scheme βs and βHH > βHL, low eﬀort from both agents is also an
equilibrium. However, the agents are indiﬀerent between the two equilibria
(H,H) and (L,L) since the JPE scheme satisfying (3) has wage qLc∆q , and we
have qHc∆q − c =
qLc
∆q .
Let us now proceed to the repeated setting, but still assume that output
is verifiable. In a repeated setting, the agents can exploit the fact that they
are able to observe each other’s eﬀort decisions. In particular, they can play
a repeated game where they both play high eﬀort if the other agent played
high eﬀort in the previous period. In order for such a strategy to constitute
a subgame perfect equilibrium, we must have:
1
1− δ (π(H,H;β)− c) ≥ π(L,H;β) +
δ
1− δ min {π(L,L ;β), π(L,H;β)} ,
(5)
where δ is the discount factor. The LHS shows the expected present value
of playing high eﬀort, while the RHS shows the expected present value from
unilaterally playing low eﬀort in one period and being subsequently pun-
ished by the worst possible equilibrium payoﬀ. Hence (5) says that, given
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the strategy to play high eﬀort if the other agent played high eﬀort in the
previous period, an agent will play high eﬀort as long as the present value
from playing high eﬀort is greater than the present value from playing low
eﬀort. Note that (5) is a necessary but not suﬃcient condition. For (5) to
be suﬃcient, the punishment path specified on the right hand side must also
be self-enforcing.
Observe that in a JPE scheme π(L,H ;β) > π(L,L;β). Thus the right
hand side of (5) becomes π(L,H,β) + δ1−δπ(L,L ;β). In an RPE scheme,
however, where π(L,L ;β) ≥ π(L,H;β), the right hand side of (5) is re-
duced to 11−δπ(L,H;β). This makes (5) coincide with the static incentive
constraint, equivalent to δ = 0 . Hence, we see that repeated interaction
between the agents can increase the punishment of playing low eﬀort in a
JPE scheme, but not in an RPE scheme. We have:
Lemma 2 (Che and Yoo 2001) The optimal repeated wage contract when
output is verifiable is the JPE scheme βJ ≡ (βHH , 0, 0, 0) where βHH =
c
(qH+δqL)∆q .
The intuition is straightforward: In the JPE scheme, low eﬀort from
agent i does not only imply a reduced chance for him to realize high values,
it also implies that his peer plays low eﬀort and thus lowers the chance of
realizing high values in the future. This is costly for the agent since a JPE
scheme promises highest wages if both realize high values. This is the peer-
monitoring advantage of JPE: the repeated interaction between the agents
yields both direct and implicit incentives to exert high eﬀort. This lowers
the cost of providing incentives.
As shown in the appendix any JPE contract (βHH , βHL, 0, 0) (including
βJ) for which (5) is binding has the property that the worst sustainable
punishment - low eﬀort from both workers (L,L) - is self-enforcing. This
makes high eﬀort from both agents (H,H) a subgame perfect equilibrium,
and this equilibrium moreover yields each worker a higher payoﬀ than (L,L).
(Che and Yoo call this a ‘team equilibrium’). Hence, the incentive constraint
given by (5) is suﬃcient.
2.2 Relational contract between principal and agents
Unlike Che and Yoo, we will now assume that the value realizations are
not verifiable to a third party. Hence, the contract between the agents
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and the principal must therefore be self-enforcing, and thus ‘relational’ by
definition. We consider a multilateral relational contract, which implies
that any deviation by the principal triggers low eﬀort from both agents. The
principal honors the contract only if both agents honored the contract in the
previous period. The agents honor the contract only if the principal honored
the contract with both agents in the previous period. A natural explanation
for this multilateral feature is that the agents interpret a unilateral contact
breach (i.e. the principal deviates from the contract with only one the of
agents) as evidence that the principal is not trustworthy (see Bewley, 1999;
and Levin, 2002).
The contract is self-enforcing if the present value of honoring is greater
than the present value of reneging. Ex post realizations of values, the prin-
cipal can renege on the contract by refusing to pay the promised wage, while
the agents can renege by refusing to accept the promised wage. The parties
play trigger strategies. Like Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002), we assume
that if one of the parties renege on the relational employment contract, the
other insists on spot employment forever after. Spot employment implies
that the agents exert low eﬀort, but receive zero wage.10
We will now deduce the condition for the relational contract to be self-
enforcing. Note first that the agents will always honor the relational contract
as long as the incentive constraints hold. Hence, when deducing the enforce-
ability constraint (or ’implementability condition’), it is the condition that
makes the principal honor the contract that is relevant. For each output re-
alization Qi, Qj , i, j = L,H, the principal must then find it better to pay the
agents the specified bonuses βij+βji rather than renege on these payments.
This is expressed by the following condition:
max{2βHH , βHL + βLH , 2βLL} ≤
2δ
1− δ [∆q∆Q− π(H,H;β)] .
The left hand side is today’s loss from honoring the contract, while the right
hand side is the future gain from honoring, namely the present value of the
expected gain from high rather than low eﬀort minus the wage cost. The
constraint will clearly bind at the outcome where the contract specifies the
10As opposed to here, where it is (implicitly) assumed that the principal owns the goods
once they are produced, Kvaløy and Olsen (2005) analyze a multilateral realtional contract
where the agents can hold-up values ex post.
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highest total bonus payments.
As we will see, an optimal contract will never bind at outcome (QL, QL).
Note then that the binding constraint for the principal to honor the contract
depends on whether βHL+βLH > 2βHH or not. For βHL+βLH > 2βHH the
constraint is binding at outcome (QH , QL), but for βHL+βLH < 2βHH the
constraint is binding at outcome (QH ,QH) (paying each agent at (QH , QL)
costs more than paying, say, only the best at (QH ,QL)). In a JPE and IPE
scheme the constraint is thus binding at outcome (QH , QH).
We clearly see the ’commitment advantage’ of RPE. While the principal
‘risks’ paying both agents high bonuses in the JPE scheme, she only risks
paying one of the agents the highest bonus in the RPE scheme (at least in
its extreme form with only βHL positive). But, due to the ’peer monitoring
advantage’ of JPE, the necessary JPE wage is for most parameter values
lower-powered and thus easier to implement. Hence, there is a trade oﬀ
between enforcing a double set of ’medium size’ JPE bonuses and a single,
but (in most cases) larger ’winner prize’ in RPE.
3 Comparative analysis of optimal contracts
We will now seek to determine the optimal contract for a given discount
factor δ. Consider first the constraints for the principal’s wage minimization
program. Note that the implementability condition discussed above can be
written as
1− δ
δ max{βHH ,
βHL + βLH
2
, βLL}
+ q2HβHH + qH(1− qH)(βHL + βLH) + (1− qH)2βLL ≤ ∆q∆Q. (GE)
As pointed out in the discussion following (5), the agents’ IC condition for
an RPE contract takes the following form:11
qHβHH + (1− qH)βHL − qHβLH − (1− qH)βLL ≥
c
∆q . (IR)
From that discussion it also follows that for a JPE contract the IC condition
(5) is of the form 11−δπ(H,H ;β) ≥ π(L,H, β) +
δ
1−δπ(L,L ;β), and hence
11Note that IR is not collusion proof. We analyze collusion in the next section.
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can be written as
(qH + δqL)βHH + (1− qH − δqL)βHL
+ (δ − qH − δqL)βLH − (1− qH + δ(1− qL))βLL ≥
c
∆q . (IJ)
Consider then the wage minimization problem for the principal;
minπ =
£
q2HβHH + qH(1− qH)(βHL + βLH) + (1− qH)2βLL
¤
,
subject to the implementability condition (GE), and the agents’ IC condi-
tions (IR) and (IJ), respectively. We first note that we can restrict attention
to contracts with βLH = βLL = 0:
Lemma 3 If the set of implementable contracts is non-empty, the least-cost
contract has βLH = βLL = 0.
Proof. Note that a reduction of βLL will relax all constraints and hence
ease implementation. It will of course also reduce wage costs. Next note that
for an RPE contract a reduction of βLH will relax the relevant constraints
IR and GE, and it will reduce costs. For a JPE contract we see that a unit
reduction of βLH combined with a unit increase of βHL will not aﬀect GE
but will strictly relax IJ. Hence we can increase βHL less (so that ∆(βHL+
βLH) < 0) and still satisfy both constraints (GE and IJ). Reducing βLH this
way will thus ease implementation and reduce wage costs. This proves the
lemma.
The lemma allows us to consider only contracts of the form (βHH , βHL, 0, 0).
We will refer to contracts with two positive elements as JPE2 when βHH >
βHL and RPE2 (when βHH < βHL), respectively. The border case (when
βHH = βHL) is still referred to as an IPE contract. We will also refer to
contracts with a single positive element as JPE1 (when βHH > 0) and RPE1
(when βHL > 0), respectively.
For these contracts the constraints take the form
1− δ
δ max{βHH ,
βHL
2
}+ q2HβHH + qH(1− qH)βHL ≤ ∆q∆Q, (GE)
qHβHH + (1− qH)βHL ≥
c
∆q , (IR)
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(qH + δqL)βHH + (1− qH − δqL)βHL ≥
c
∆q . (IJ)
The constraints and the set of feasible contracts can be represented graphi-
cally, as illustrated in Figure 1.
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HH HLβ β=  
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        IJ       GE  
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                                                                                                HLβ  
Figure 1. Constraints and feasible contracts
Points above and below the diagonal (where βHH = βHL) represent
JPE and RPE contracts, respectively. The shaded area shows the set of im-
plementable contracts. Note that the implementability constraint GE has a
kink at βHH = βHL. The figure illustrates a case where a limited set of JPE
and RPE contracts are feasible, but no JPE1 contract can be implemented.
The least costly contract is thus a JPE2 contract; more specifically the con-
tract at the intersection point between GE and IJ. This contract is optimal
because iso-cost lines (represented by q2HβHH+qH(1−qH)βHL = const) are
parallel to the line representing IR, and this line is always steeper than IJ.
The best RPE2 and IPE contracts are equally costly (the common cost is
qH c∆q , see Lemma 1), but they cost more than the best JPE2 contract.
Let δJ be the minimal discount factor for which a JPE1 contract can be
implemented. The figure illustrates a case where δ < δJ , so no JPE1 con-
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tracts are feasible. The factor δJ can be found by solving the two constraints
(GE and IJ) for the minimal δ when βHL = 0. This yields the following
equation for δJ :
1− δJ
δJ
− (∆q)2∆Qc qLδJ =
·
(∆q)2∆Qc − qH
¸
qH . (6)
The figure also makes it clear that for δ < δJ there are implementable JPE2
contracts if and only if some part of the diagonal is within the shaded area,
meaning that there is a range of contracts with βHH = βHL —i.e. IPE
contracts—that satisfy both constraints (GE and IJ). Let δI be the minimal
discount factor for which an IPE contract can be implemented. This factor
can be found by solving the two constraints (GE and IJ) for the minimal δ
when βHH = βHL. This yields the following equation for δI :
1− δI
δI
=
·
(∆q)2∆Qc − qH
¸
. (7)
Note that an IPE contract will be implementable (i.e. δI < 1) only if the
expression in the square bracket is positive. Recall that the minimal cost
(per agent) for an IPE contract is qH c∆q (the cost for any contract on IR).
In order for the principal to find it profitable to induce high eﬀort by the
agents via such a contract, the expected gain in output must be higher than
the cost, i.e. we must have ∆q∆Q ≥ qH c∆q . This is precisely the condition
that makes δI well defined in (7).
As noted, the graphs in Figure 1 correspond to a case where δI < δ < δJ ,
and here a unique JPE2 contract is optimal. As the discount factor moves
from δJ to δI , the intersection point between GE and IJ moves southeast
towards the diagonal. Hence, the closer the discount factor gets to δI , the
more the principal must reduce βHH and increase βHL. The intuition for this
is as follows: As the discount factor decreases, exploiting peer monitoring
becomes more costly. A JPE contract where most of the bonus payments
are concentrated in βHH (such as the stark JPE1 contract) has a lower wage
cost than the least costly IPE, but the maximum total pay that the principal
risks paying is also larger compared to IPE (or to a JPE2 scheme that is
close to IPE). Hence, when δ = δI + ε, (ε close to zero), the optimal scheme
is a unique JPE2 contract that is quite close to IPE.
For yet a lower discount factor; δ < min{δI , δJ}, neither JPE1 nor JPE2
14
contracts can be implemented. For such a δ it is possible that a RPE2
contract will be feasible, and if so is the case it follows that such a contract
will be optimal.
Let δR2 be the minimal discount factor for which an RPE2 contract
can be implemented. From the geometry of the constraints it follows that
the set of implementable RPE2 contracts is non-empty if and only if some
RPE2 contract with βHH =
βHL
2 can be implemented (see Figure 1 and
note that the implementability constraint GE is always steeper than IR for
βHH <
βHL
2 ). The critical discount factor δR2 can thus be found by solving
the two constraints (GE and IR) for the minimal δ when βHH =
βHL
2 . This
yields
1− δR2
δR2
=
·
(∆q)2∆Qc − qH
¸
(2− qH). (8)
Comparing with the condition (7) defining δI we see that δR2 < δI . Thus,
whenever it is possible to implement an IPE contract (i.e. when δI < 1),
it is also possible to implement some RPE2 contract. This illustrates the
commitment advantage of RPE.
But the fact that δR2 < δI does not mean that any RPE contract is
implementable when IPE is implementable. For instance, if δ = δI > δR2,
the RPE1 contract (0, βHL, 0, 0) is not necessarily implementable. When
qH > 12 a single RPE bonus βHL =
c
∆q(1−qH) is larger than a double set of
IPE bonuses 2 c∆q . Hence the incentive for the principal to deviate is larger
under this RPE1 contract than under the IPE contract. Thus, if δR2 < δ ≤
min{δI , δJ} and qH > 12 , then the stark RPE1 contract (0, βHL, 0, 0) is not
part of the set of feasible RPE2 contracts.
The discussion so far can be summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 (i) When δ ≥ δJ a unique JPE1 contract is optimal. For
δ < δJ we have:
(ii) If δI < δ < δJ a unique JPE2 contract is optimal.
(iii) If δR2 ≤ δ ≤ min{δI , δJ}, all RPE2 contracts that satisfy (IR) with
equality and (GE) are optimal.
(iv) For δ < min{δR2, δI , δJ} no incentive contracts are implementable.
Recall that δR2 < δI holds as long as the principal finds it profitable to
induce high eﬀort; see the discussion following (7). In light of this, Propo-
sition 1 elucidates the trade-oﬀ between RPE’s commitment advantage and
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JPE’s peer monitoring advantage. Since there is no common noise in our
model, a JPE scheme is always optimal if it can be implemented (Proposi-
tion 1, parts (i) and (ii)). However, RPE schemes are in general easier to
implement, and if no JPE contracts can be implemented there may exist
discount factors where RPE is implementable and thus optimal (part (iii)).
In order to draw more economic intuition out of Proposition 1, we now
compare further the critical discount factors necessary to implement the
defined contracts. In particular, we want to determine under which condi-
tions the various cases delineated in the proposition will arise. We find the
following:
Proposition 2 There are bounds bi = bi(qH , qL), such that
δi < δJ ⇐⇒
h
(∆q)2∆Qc − qH
i
> bi, i ∈ {I,R2}.
The bounds bi are given by
bi(qH , qL) =
r³
ai−qH−qL
2(ai−qH)ai
´2
+ qHqL2(ai−qH)ai −
ai−qH−qL
2(ai−qH)ai ,
where aI = 1, aR2 = 2− qH .
We are here particularly interested in when it is the case that no JPE1
contract is implementable, but some ’second best’ contract (JPE2, IPE or
RPE2) is implementable, i.e. when it is the case that δI < δJ and/or
δR2 < δJ . From the proposition we see that this can occur only if the
expression A =
h
(∆q)2∆Qc − qH
i
is suﬃciently large. Recall that in RPE
or IPE the principal will induce high eﬀort only if A > 0. We see that for
A small (A ≈ 0) we will clearly have δJ < δI , δR2, and a JPE1 contract
can then be implemented whenever an RPE2 or JPE2 (or IPE) contract
can be implemented. But if A becomes suﬃciently high, we will conversely
have δi < δJ . Hence, a necessary condition for RPE2 or JPE2 (or IPE)
to be optimal is that the eﬀort-productivity, ∆q∆Qc , is suﬃciently high.12
If qL and QL are constants (e.g. equal to zero) variations in ∆q∆Qc will
reflect variations in skills. We can then say that the agents’ skills must be
suﬃciently high in order for JPE2 or RPE2 to be implementable.
Propositions 1 and 2 are illustrated in figure 2.13
12Eﬀort-productivity ∆q∆Qc measures the expected gain in output per unit cost of eﬀort
when eﬀort increases. This diﬀers from labor-productivity (or ’agent producitivity’), since
a high -productive agent may have low eﬀort-productivity (i.e both QL and QH high, but
∆Q low). However, it is reaonsalbe to assume that a high-productive agent has higher
eﬀort-productivity than a low-producitve agent.
13The figure is generated with qH = 0.6 and qL = 0.3.
16
2015105
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
JPE1
RPE2 JPE2
JPE1
Q
c
∆
δ
Figure 2. Critical discount factors as function of productivity
The figure shows the relationship between δ, ∆Qc , and optimal incentive
regimes. The curves show critical discount factors as functions of ∆Qc ,where
the thick solid line is δJ , the thin solid line is δR2, and the dotted line is
δI . A change in other parameters would shift all three curves. In particular,
note that an increase in qH − qL = ∆q, will shift the curves leftward, and
thus ease implementation.
Like in Che and Yoo, we see that RPE tends to dominate for low discount
factors, while JPE dominates for high discount factors. However, in Che and
Yoo the optimality of RPE depends on a positive common shock. Since we
assume no common noise, RPE is always more costly than JPE in our model.
The expected JPE wage is always lower than the expected RPE wage due to
the peer-monitoring advantage of JPE. But the relational contract constraint
that we add to the analysis makes the starkest JPE contract unfeasible on
lower discount factors. If the JPE bonus βHH becomes suﬃciently high (as
it does with low discount factors), the maximum wage that the principal
’risks’ paying is higher in JPE than in RPE, and relational JPE contracts
are therefore relatively harder to implement when the discount factor is low.
Let us now discuss variations in productivity generated by variations in
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the ratio ∆Qc . In Che and Yoo such variations are not relevant, except that
productivity must be suﬃciently large in order that the principal should
have incentives to induce high eﬀort. In our model ∆Qc is decisive for the
determination of incentive regime. We see that when ∆Qc is very high, any
scheme can be implemented (since the principal’s loss from reneging is high).
For a given discount factor, say δ = 0.6, we see that as ∆Qc decreases, the
principal cannot commit to JPE1, and she must must oﬀer a JPE2 contract.
With further decreases in ∆Qc , the principal cannot commit to JPE2, and
she must oﬀer an RPE2 contract. This shows the commitment advantage of
RPE, which here makes such a contract optimal for relatively low values of
∆Q
c .
The latter observation seems at odds with our statements that we will
see a higher frequency of RPE as we move from low productivity to high
productivity environments. However, it is not natural to think of all trans-
actions/relationships/industries as governed by the same discount factor.
We can interpret the discount factor as a measure for the dependency, or
trust level, between the transacting parties (see e.g. Hart, 2001, on inter-
preting δ as trust; and James Jr., 2002, for a nice survey on the economic
concept of trust). We can say that the vertical axis represents dependency
levels, or trust levels, where δ = 0 is a spot market, and δ = 1 is a fully
dependent high-trust relationship. We see that as ∆Qc increases, the frac-
tion of δ0s where RPE2 is optimal increases more than the fraction of δ0s
where JPE2 is optimal, which again increases more than the fraction of δ0s
where JPE1 is optimal. Hence, our interpretation of the analysis is that
we will see a higher frequency of RPE (and JPE2 schemes that lies close
to IPE) as we move from low-productive to high-productive environments.
On low eﬀort-productivity, relational contracts can only be implemented on
high trust-levels, i.e. high discount factors. This favors JPE since implicit
contracts between the agents are then easy to self-enforce (in Figure 2 we
see that when ∆Qc < 9.3, only JPE1 can be implemented, but this requires
δ > 0.76). As we move towards high-productive environments, the cost of
contract deviation becomes higher and relational contracts can therefore be
implemented on lower discount factors. We will then expect a larger fraction
of RPE, since JPE is vulnerable to low discount factors.
However, irrespective of how one interprets Figure 2, it clearly suggests
a relationship between productivity, measured as return from eﬀort, and
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incentive regime. This a quite diﬀerent approach than the standard moral
hazard models that stress the trade-oﬀ between incentives and insurance.
Since we assume risk neutrality, insurance is not as issue in our model. As
indicated in the introduction, a technical diﬃculty with risk aversion is that
it does not ensure the optimality of stationary contracts (see Levin 2003).
Introducing risk aversion would thus considerably complicate the analysis.
At the outset, this does not justify the neutrality-assumption. So one may
ask whether risk aversion would alter our results. In a more general model
with verifiable output, Green and Stokey (1983) show that IPE dominates
RPE when agents are risk averse and there are no common shocks. Our
Lemma 1 would thus be altered if we introduce risk aversion. Risk aversion
would also imply relatively higher critical discount factors for JPE and RPE
than for IPE, since social surplus from these schemes are lowered when
agents are exposed to their peer’s risk. In Figure 2 this should imply that
the solid lines take a larger shift to the right than the dotted line. But
the basic trade-oﬀ between the peer-monitoring advantage of JPE and the
commitment-advantage of RPE should still apply.
4 Collusion
In contrast to IPE and JPE, RPE is vulnerable to collusion. If the principal
oﬀers an RPE contract, then the agents can be better oﬀ if they both play
low eﬀort (L,L) than if they both play high eﬀort (H,H). To see this note that
a least-cost RPE contract (which satisfies IR with equality) yields expected
wages equal to qH c∆q per agent if eﬀorts are (H,H). If eﬀorts are (L,L), the
expected wage is straightforwardly seen to exceed qL c∆q iﬀ βHL > βHH . The
diﬀerence in wage payments is then smaller than the cost c of high eﬀort,
hence in such a contract the agents are better oﬀ if they can coordinate on
both exerting low rather than high eﬀort.
As we shall see, the agents can sustain such a low-eﬀort ’collusive’ out-
come as a subgame perfect equilibrium, but only if the discount factor is
suﬃciently high. The agents can, however, for the given RPE contract
always sustain a coordinated randomized strategy, and in particular a cor-
related randomization where they play (H,L) and (L,H) with equal proba-
bilities (for parameters such that qLqH ≤
1
2 the latter is in fact optimal for the
agents). To prevent such an outcome, the principal must then modify the
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RPE contract such that the collusive strategy is no longer an equilibrium for
the agents. This will typically increase expected wage costs, and hence make
RPE contracts more expensive than the least-cost IPE contract (which is
not vulnerable to collusion) for the principal. If the IPE contract is feasible,
it may therefore be uniquely optimal. On the other hand, if neither this
IPE contract nor any JPE contract is implementable, it can still be possible
to implement a set of ’collusion proof’ RPE contracts, and the least-cost
contract among those will be the uniquely optimal one for the principal.
We show in this section the following results:
1. The least-cost collusion proof RPE scheme entails the lowest possible
βHL, i.e. the best RPE contract lies as close as possible to IPE. As a result
IPE can be uniquely optimal.
2. If we introduce common noise when agents can collude, IPE can be
uniquely optimal even if output is verifiable.
3. The main results in the previous section regarding variations in eﬀort
productivity still apply.
Turning to the analysis, consider first a correlated randomization where
the agents play (H,L) and (L,H) with equal probabilities. Can the agents
sustain this as a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) outcome in the repeated
game? Yes, but for this to be the case it is necessary that an agent is not
tempted to deviate when he is to play low eﬀort as a part of (L,H). This
means that we must have:
π(L,H;β)+ δ
1− δ
1
2
(π(L,H;β)+π(H,L;β)−c) ≥ π(H,H;β)−c+ δ
1− δ (π(H,H ;β)−c).
The LHS is the payoﬀ associated with adhering to the collusive strategy.
The RHS is the payoﬀ obtained by deviating to high eﬀort and then being
punished in the future by the worst SPE, namely (H,H) forever.
To prevent such a ’collusive’ equilibrium, the principal must choose
bonuses such that the above inequality is reversed. This entails bonuses
that fulfill the following condition:
qHβHH + (1− qH −
δ
2
)βHL > (1−
δ
2
)
c
∆q . (IRC)
An RPE contract that satisfies IRC is thus immune to collusion that involves
playing (H,L) and (L,H) with equal probabilities. As we shall see it is
immune to a much wider class of collusive strategies.
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Consider next the collusive strategy where the agents coordinate on both
exerting low eﬀort. To sustain this as a SPE outcome in the repeated game,
an agent must not be tempted to deviate when he is to play low eﬀort as
a part of (L,L). By a similar reasoning as above we find that the principal
can upset this equilibrium by choosing bonuses that satisfy the following
condition (see the appendix):
(δqH + qL)βHH + (1− qL − δqH)βHL >
c
∆q . (IRL)
It turns out that, depending on the parameters, one of the two collusive
strategies we have considered here will be optimal for the agents. Moreover,
this implies that the two conditions IRC and IRL completely characterizes
the set of collusion proof RPE contracts. We have the following result:
Lemma 4 For any RPE contract that satisfies IR we have:
(i) For qLqH ≤
1
2 the correlated strategy where the agents play (H,L) and (L,H)
with equal probabilities is optimal for the agents in the sense of maximizing
their per period payoﬀ. For qLqH >
1
2 the pure (L,L) strategy is optimal.
(ii) The contract is collusion proof if and only if it satisfies IRC and IRL.
(iii) For a set of parameters including qLqH ≤ 2(
√
2− 1) = 0.828 the contract
is collusion proof if and only if it satisfies IRC.
An RPE contract satisfying IR is thus immune to any form of collusion if
and only if it satisfies both IRC and IRL. Collusion on (L,L) is feasible if the
discount factor is suﬃciently high, and for such discount factors contracts
may have to be constrained more than what is implied by IRC in order to
prevent collusion. But for a wide set of parameters, including qLqH ≤ 0.828,
it is the case that IRL is satisfied whenever IRC is, and hence IRC alone is
then necessary and suﬃcient to prevent collusion. To make the exposition
cleaner we consider only the latter case in the following.
Given the parameter restriction, condition IRC defines the set of col-
lusion proof RPE2 contracts, and it is geometrically represented by a line
delineating this set such as illustrated in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Implementable and collusion proof contracts
The line representing IRC intersects IR at the point βHH = βHL = c∆q ,
and we see that the condition is binding (reduces the set of feasible contracts)
since IRC is flatter than IR. An RPE contract is vulnerable to collusion, and
we see that the principal must increase the bonus βHH for good performance
by both agents relative to the bonus βHL for good performance by only one
agent (making the constraint flatter) in order to prevent the agents from
colluding on low eﬀorts.
Recall that iso-cost lines are parallel to IR. All RPE contracts that satisfy
IRC are therefore more costly than, and thus dominated by the IPE contract
βHH = βHL = c∆q . Hence, if the IPE contract is feasible, i.e. if δ > δI , it
will be preferred by the principal to any feasible RPE contract.
Figure 3 illustrates a case where neither the IPE contract nor any JPE
contracts are feasible, and where the collusion constraint binds, i.e. where
δ < min{δI , δJ}. In this case there is a set of feasible collusion proof RPE
contracts (the shaded area), and we see that the uniquely optimal contract
is represented by the point in this set that is on IRC and is closest to IPE
(the northwest intersection between GE and IRC).
From the figure it is clear that there is a non-empty set of feasible col-
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lusion proof RPE contracts if IRC intersects the line βHH =
βLH
2 to the
left of where GE intersects this line. Algebraically this condition takes the
following form (see the appendix for the derivation):
1− δ
δ −
·
(∆q)2∆Qc − qH
¸
(2−qH) ≤
1− δ
2
−δ
·
(∆q)2∆Qc − qH
¸
− δ
2
q2H . (9)
The condition defines the set of discount factors for which such a set of
feasible and collusion proof RPE contracts exists.14 The terms on the RHS
makes this condition diﬀerent from the one defining the critical δR2 in the
absence of collusion (8). The condition will hold for δ in an interval (δRC , δˆ),
where δˆ ≤ 1. (Written as g(δ) ≤ 0 condition (9) is represented by a second-
order polynomial.) The smaller root δRC is the critical lowest discount
factor for which there will be an (economically interesting) collusion proof
RPE contract that can be implemented. Comparing (9) and (8), we see
that (9) does not hold for δ = δR2, hence we must have δRC > δR2.15
The collusion proofness constraint naturally increases the critical discount
factor for implementation. Comparing with the critical discount factor δI
for IPE contracts defined in (7), we see that δI will satisfy (9) and hence will
exceed δRC (δRC < δI), only if the square bracket (or eﬀort-productivity) is
suﬃciently large.
We can now state the following proposition:
Proposition 3 For a set of parameters including qLqH ≤ 2(
√
2 − 1) the fol-
lowing holds. When contracts must be proof to collusion by the agents we
have:
(i) If δI < δ < δJ a unique JPE2 contract is optimal.
(ii) If δ = δI < δJ , then a pure IPE contract is uniquely optimal.
(iii) If δ ∈ (δRC , δˆ) and δ < min{δI , δJ}, the optimal scheme is a unique
RPE2 contract (the one that lies as close as possible to IPE).
(iv) If δ < min{δRC , δI , δJ} no collusion proof incentive contracts are im-
plementable.
Proposition 3 is similar to Proposition 1 (where collusion is not possible),
14 In the present setting the condition is suﬃcient but strictly speaking not necessary,
since IRC may be flatter than GE (for large δ) and hence may intersect GE to the left of
the line βHH = βLH/2. But such a case is not economically interesting, since any feasible
RPE contract would then be dominated by the IPE contract.
15For δ = δR2 defined in (8) the left hand side of (9) is zero while the right hand side is
negative.
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except for one important aspect. Contrary to the former case, the optimal
RPE2 contract is now not any RPE2 contract that lies on IR and satisfies the
enforceability constraint. Instead there is a unique optimal RPE2 contract,
and this lies as close as possible to IPE. This also implies that IPE may be
uniquely optimal. The intuition behind this is straightforward: By increasing
βHH and reducing βHL, the agent’s future gain from sustaining collusion is
reduced. Hence the wage costs incurred by the principal to prevent collusion
are reduced.
It is easy to see that a suﬃciently high ∆Qc is still a necessary condition
for an RPE2 contract to be optimal. The easiest way to verify this is to note
that when ∆Qc is suﬃciently small, then the relational contract can only be
implemented for δ close to one. But for δ close to one, RPE schemes are
impossible to implement because collusion is then easy to sustain. As ∆Qc
increases, it is possible to implement relational contracts on lower discount
factors. And with lower discount factors collusion is harder to sustain (and
thus easier to prevent). Hence, the result that relative performance eval-
uation can only be optimal when eﬀort productivity is suﬃciently high is
clearer under the threat of collusion. Figure 4 is similar to Figure 2 and
illustrates how the critical discount factors, including δRC , varies with ∆Qc .
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Figure 4. Critical discount factors under collusion proofness.
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Verifiable output. Before we leave this section, we will show that under
the threat of collusion IPE can be optimal even if the contract is verifiable.
For this to occur, however, we must introduce common noise. As we have
seen, JPE is less costly than IPE when output is verifiable (Lemma 2).
However, if we introduce common noise JPE becomes less attractive since
the cost of providing JPE is high if the probability of a positive common
shock is high. Hence, common noise makes IPE less costly than JPE for some
parameter values. What about IPE vs RPE? As we have seen, collusion
makes IPE less costly than RPE. If we introduce common noise, though,
RPE becomes less costly than IPE for some parameter values (since RPE
filters out common noise). But to sum up: Collusion weakens RPE, while
common noise weakens JPE. This makes IPE potentially uniquely optimal
even if the contract is verifiable:
We follow Che and Yoo, assuming that a favorable shock occurs with
probability σ ∈ (0, 1), in which both agents produce high values for the
principal. If the shock is unfavorable, the probability for agent i of realizing
QH is still qH if the agent’s eﬀort is high and qL if the agent’s eﬀort is
low. Observe now that a marginal increase in βHH , while holding the IC
constraint (IRC) with equality, will reduce the principal’s surplus (increase
the wage) when σ is suﬃciently high : ∂π∂βHH = σ+(1−σ)q
2
H+(1−σ)qH(1−
qH) ∂βHL∂βHH = σ+ (1− σ)q
2
H(1−
1−qH
1−qH− δ2
) . Hence the optimal collusion proof
incentive scheme with βHH ≤ βHL has either βHH = 0 or βHH = βHL.
When βHH = 0, the collusion proof RPE scheme has wage cost qH(1 −
qH) (2−δ)(2−2qH−δ)∆q per agent, which exceeds the per agent wage cost under
IPE (σ + (1 − σ)qH) c∆q(1−σ) when δ >
2σ(1−qH)
q2H(1−σ)+σ
= δ. The expected cost
per agent under the JPE1 contract is (σ + (1 − σ)qHqH) c∆q(1−σ)(qH+δqL) .
Hence, the expected cost per agent is lower under IPE than under JPE if
δ < σ(1−qH)qL(qH(1−σ)+σ) = δ. A necessary condition for IPE to be optimal is then
that δ > δ, which is true for 1 ≥ σ > 2qHqL−q
2
H
2qHqL−2qL−q2H+1
, which can only hold
for qL ≤ 12 . We can thus state:
Proposition 4 When output is verifiable, and collusion is possible, then if
parameters are such that δ > δ, there exist discount factors δ > δ > δ where
independent performance evaluation is optimal.
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5 Concluding remarks
A large literature has explored the merits of RPE and JPE in static settings.
It is, however, often natural to think of managers and workers interacting
repeatedly and basing pay on non-contractible performance measures. We
know that joint performance evaluation can be optimal in dynamic settings
since peer monitoring works as an incentive device. On the other hand, non-
contractable performance measures gives relative performance evaluation a
commitment advantage since the principal need only commit to a limited to-
tal payment. In this paper we have compared these competing eﬀects. Our
main result is that the agents’ productivity is decisive for the feasibility of
diﬀerent incentive regimes. Ceteris paribus, low productivity calls for RPE,
since low productivity increases the principal’s incentives to deviate from
the relational contract, and RPE limits total payment. However, low pro-
ductivity makes high discount factors necessary for implementing relational
contracts, and high discount factors support JPE’s peer-monitoring device.
We have thus argued that our model predicts a higher frequency of RPE as
we move from low to high-productive environments, since high productivity
makes it possible to implement relational contracts on low discount factors.
Interestingly, our result seems consistent with the established hypothesis
that high productive workers are more common under high-powered incen-
tive regimes. However, we do not develop a "sorting argument", in which
high productive workers seek high-powered incentive contracts. Instead, it is
the principal’s opportunity to renege from promises that makes productivity
matter, since the cost from reneging is positively related to the productivity
of the agents. Our analysis thus indicates that the causality puzzle between
contracts and other relevant variables may still occur even if one controls
for adverse selection.
6 Appendix
Appendix to Lemma 1:
We first show that any RPE scheme and the IPE scheme in βs also
satisfy (3). Note that for any contract (βHH , βHL, 0, 0) we have
π(H,H,β)+π(L,L,β)−π(H,L,β)−π(L,H,β) = (∆q)2(βHH−βHL). (10)
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Hence, π(H,H,βs) − c + π(L,L,βs) ≤ π(H,L,βs) − c + π(L,H,βs) when
βHL ≥ βHH . This implies that (3) is satisfied, since π(H,H,βs) − c ≥
π(L,H,βs).
Note that JPE schemes in βs may not satisfy (3). When βHL < βHH ,
then π(H,H,βs)+π(L,L,βs)−π(H,L,βs)−π(L,H,βs) > 0, hence π(H,H,βs)−
c+ π(L,L,βs) > π(H,L,βs)− c+ π(L,H,βs), which does not ensure that
π(L,L,βs) ≤ π(H,L,βs)− c.
We finally find the optimal JPE scheme satisfying π(H,L,β) − c ≥
π(L,L,β). This contraint can be written
qLβHH + (1− qL)βHL − qLβLH − (1− qL)βLL ≥
c
∆q . (11)
Now any combination of βHH and βHL that satisfies the IC-constraint (11)
with equality and has βLH = βLL = 0 is optimal. Solving the constraint for
βHH or βHL and inserting in the objective function yields expected wage
π = qL c∆q always.
Proof of Lemma 2:
When π(L,H ;β) > π(L,L;β),we can write the constraint (5) as
(qH+δqL)βHH+(1−qH−δqL)βHL−(δ−qH−δqL)βLH−(1−qH+δ(1−qL))βLL ≥
c
∆q .
The left hand side of the constraint is decreasing in βLL, while the objective
function π(H,H;β) = (q2HβHH + qH(1− qH)(βHL + βLH) + (1− qH)2βLL)
is increasing in βLL. Hence, it is optimal to set βLL = 0. Observe that the
coeﬃcient of βHL is weakly greater than that of βLH in the left hand side
of the contraint, but that their coeﬃcients are the same in the objective
function. It is thus optimal to set βLH = 0. Moreover, observe that a
marginal increase in βHL, while holding the constraint with equality, will
reduce the principal’s surplus (increase the wage): ∂π(H,H;β)∂βHL = q
2
H
∂βHH
∂βHL
+
qH(1−qH) = −q2H
(1−qH−δqL)
qH+δqL +qH(1−qH) > 0 for δ > 0. Hence it is optimal
to set βHL = 0. The optimal JPE scheme is thus βJ ≡ (βHH , 0, 0, 0) where
βHH = c(qH+δqL)∆q . For JPE to dominate IPE and RPE we must have
q2Hc
(qH+δqL)∆q <
qH c
∆q which holds for δ > 0.
By an argument similar to Che and Yoo, we can show that any JPE con-
tract βj = (βHH , βHL, 0, 0) where (5) is binding and βHH > βHL (including
βJ) makes the worst sustainable punishment -low eﬀort from both workers
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(L,L)- self-enforcing. Given that (5) is binding we have 11−δ (π(H,H;β
j) −
c) = π(L,H;βj)+ δ1−δπ(L,L ;β
j). Since π(L,H;βj) > π(L,L ;βj), this im-
plies π(H,H;βj)−c < π(L,H;βj). Then, since π(H,H;βj)+π(L,L ;βj)−
π(H,L;βj)−π(L,H;βj) > 0 by (10), we have π(L,L ;βj) > π(H,L;βj)−c
(Comment: Note that in the static case π(H,H;βj) − c < π(L,H;βj) and
π(L,L ;βj) > π(H,L;βj) − c would break the IC contraint. The virtue of
JPE is that the IC contraint is slacked in the repeated setting).
Proof of Proposition 2:
Here we compare the critical δ’s; δJ , δI , δR2. They are given by (6),(7)
and (8), respectively. The equation (6) for δJ has the form F (δJ) = 0, where
F 0 < 0. Hence δi < δJ iﬀ F (δi) > 0. Each δi is defined by an equation of
the form
1− δi
δi
= Aai, A =
·
(∆q)2∆Qc − qH
¸
> 0.
Substituting into the expression for F (δ) we thus have
δi < δJ ⇐⇒
1− δi
δi
− [A+ qH ] qLδi > AqH ⇐⇒ A(ai − qH) >
[A+ qH ] qL
Aai + 1
.
For ai − qH > 0 the last inequality holds iﬀ A exceeds the unique positive
root of the equation (ai − qH)A(Aai + 1)− [A+ qH ] qL = 0, i.e. iﬀ
A > bi ≡
sµ
ai − qH − qL
2(ai − qH)ai
¶2
+
qHqL
2(ai − qH)ai
− ai − qH − qL
2(ai − qH)ai
.
Proof of Lemma 4.
Let Π(a, b;β) denote the expected per period payoﬀ per agent when they
play a correlated (symmetric) strategy with probabilities (a, b, b, 1− a− 2b)
on eﬀort combinations (H.H), (H,L), (L,H), (L,L) respectively. We prove
statement (i) below, i.e. that b = 12 is optimal when
qL
qH ≤
1
2 , and that
a = b = 0 (the pure low-eﬀort strategy) is optimal otherwise.
A strategy with 0 < b < 12 is feasible (sustainable as a SPE) iﬀ an agent
is not tempted to deviate when he is to play L as part of (L,H) nor as part
of (L,L), i.e. iﬀ the following two conditions hold
π(L,H;β)+ δ
1− δΠ(a, b;β) ≥ π(H,H;β)−c+
δ
1− δ (π(H,H ;β)−c), (12)
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π(L,L;β)+ δ
1− δΠ(a, b;β) ≥ π(H,L;β)− c+
δ
1− δ (π(H,H ;β)− c). (13)
(The agent will never be tempted to deviate from H as a part of (H,L), since
π(H,L;β)− c > π(L,L;β)). The pure (L,L) strategy is sustainable iﬀ (13)
holds for a = b = 0, and since the payoﬀ then is Π(0, 0;β) = π(L,L;β), this
condition amounts to
1
1− δπ(L,L;β) ≥ π(H,L;β)− c+
δ
1− δ (π(H,H ;β)− c).
Substituting for the π−terms, we see that this condition is not satisfied
precisely when IRL holds.
It follows immediately that conditions IRL and IRC are necessary for
collusion proofness. For if IRL is not satisfied, then the collusive strategy
(L,L) is feasible (at least for suﬃciently large δ). And if IRC is not satisfied,
the collusive strategy b = 12 is feasible.
To prove suﬃciency suppose IRC and IRL are satisfied. Since IRC holds,
the strategy b = 12 is not feasible. By construction, IRL makes the pure
strategy (L,L) (a = b = 0) infeasible. We will show that no other collusive
strategy (0 < b < 12) can be feasible either.
Consider first qLqH ≤
1
2 . Since b =
1
2 is optimal in this case (statement
(i)), we have Π(a, b;β) ≤ Π(0, 12 ;β). But then (12) cannot hold, since this
condition by construction of IRC does not hold for b = 12 .
Consider next qLqH >
1
2 , in which case the pure strategy (L,L) (a = b = 0)
is optimal, i.e. Π(a, b;β) ≤ Π(0, 0;β). But then (13) cannot hold, since this
condition by construction of IRL does not hold for the pure (L,L) strategy
(a = b = 0). This proves that no collusive strategy is feasible, and hence
that statement (ii) holds.
To prove statement (iii), we compare the slopes of the lines defined by
equalities in IRC and IRL, respectively. The claim holds if the line for
IRC is flatter than that for IRL, which occurs if
1−qH− δ2
qH ≤
1−qL−δqH
qL+δqH . This
condition is equivalent to qL(1 − 12δ) − qH + δqH −
1
2δ
2qH ≤ 0. The latter
inequality can be written as (δ2− (1+Q)δ+2Q)12qH ≥ 0 where Q = 1−
qL
qH .
The polynomial is nonnegative for all δ ∈ (0, 1) if Q ≥ 3 − 2
√
2, i.e. if
qL
qH ≤ 2(
√
2− 1) = 0.828. This proves statement (iii) in the lemma.
It remains to prove statement (i). The expected payoﬀ Π(a, b;β) per
agent is given by 2Π(a, b;β) = a(2π(H,H)− 2c) + 2b(π(H,L) + π(L,H)−
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c) + (1− a− 2b)2π(L,L). Hence
Π(a, b;β) = a(π(H,H)−π(L,L)−c)+b(π(H,L)+π(L,H)−2π(L,L)−c)+π(L,L).
This is to be maximized, subject to a + 2b ≤ 1. For an RPE scheme we
always have, from (10) π(H,L) + π(L,H) ≥ π(H,H) + π(L,L), and hence
π(H,L) + π(L,H)− 2π(L,L) ≥ π(H,H)− π(L,L).
This shows that the payoﬀ multiplying a in Π(a, b;β) is smaller than
that multiplying b, hence a = 0 is optimal. Then b = 12 is optimal iﬀ
π(H,L) + π(L,H) − 2π(L,L) ≥ c. As shown below, this is equivalent to
[βHL − 2qL(βHL − βHH)]− c∆q ≥ 0. This inequality is satisfied for all RPE
contracts β that satisfy IR iﬀ (comparing slopes) 1−2qL2qL ≥
1−qH
qH . This is
equivalent to qLqH ≤
1
2 , and hence proves that b =
1
2 is optimal. It follows
that for qLqH >
1
2 it is optimal to set b = 0.
It then only remains to verify the condition for π(H,L) + π(L,H) −
2π(L,L) ≥ c. We have
π(H,L) + π(L,H) = (qHqLβHH + qH(1− qL)βHL)
+(qLqHβHH + qL(1− qH)βHL)
= 2qHqL(βHH − βHL) + (qH + qL)βHL.
Thus
π(H,L) + π(L,H)− 2π(L,L) = (2qHqL(βHH − βHL) + (qH + qL)βHL)
−2(q2L(βHH − βHL) + qLβHL)
= 2(qH − qL)qL(βHH − βHL) + (qH − qL)βHL
= [βHL − 2qL(βHL − βHH)]∆q.
This completes the proof.
Derivation of (9)
Consider the minimal δ for which IRC intersects βHL = 2βHH to the left
of where GE intersects this line. The two points are given by, respectively
qHβHH + (1− qH − δ2)2βHH = (1−
δ
2)
c
∆q ,
(1−δδ + q2H)βHH + qH(1− qH)2βHH = ∆q∆Q.
So the condition is
(1− δ2)
c
∆q
(2− qH − δ)
≤ ∆q∆Q
1−δ
δ + qH(2− qH)
.
This is equivalent to (9).
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